This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-orleave-it o¤er to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payo¤. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) e¢ cient trade and (ii) a unit-elastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify, in particular, the same price.
Introduction
Rapid developments in information technology have given consumers access to new information sources that in many cases allow them to acquire product information prior to trading. For an example, consider Yelp, a mobile phone app that aggregates customer reviews and makes them available to new customers. Ceteris paribus, a single consumer is better o¤ with such an app because she becomes more e¢ cient at choosing the store selling her most preferred products.
On the other hand, after the appearance of the app, stores will face customers with a di¤erent (and perhaps higher) distribution of willingness-to-pay. Therefore, stores are likely to respond by increasing their prices. As a consequence, a new information source -even when freely availablemight worsen the buyer's outcome if being better informed results in higher prices. The question then becomes: How does an information source a¤ect prices and consumer welfare? Our paper contributes to this problem by identifying information structures which are best for the buyers in a monopolistic market. Building on this result, we then characterize all the possible combinations of consumer and producer surplus which can arise from some learning.
We consider a stylized model where the seller has full bargaining power and the buyer receives a costless signal about her true valuation. The seller sets a price knowing the joint distribution of the buyer's valuation and the signal but not their realizations. We assume that the buyer's valuation is always positive and the seller's outside option is zero, such that e¢ ciency requires trade with probability one. The paper's main theorem identi…es the least informative buyeroptimal signal distribution. This distribution generates a unit-elastic demand and the seller is indi¤erent between charging any price on its support. In equilibrium, the seller sets the lowest price, p , and, since this is the lowest possible value estimate of the buyer, trade always occurs.
We show that all buyer-optimal signal structures yield the same outcome, namely that the price is p and trade always takes place.
An important observation is that the buyer's signal does not enhance the e¢ ciency of her purchasing decision along the equilibrium path. The buyer always buys the good at the equilibrium price, irrespective of her value estimate and typically even if the price exceeds her true valuation.
The buyer's optimal learning is therefore driven exclusively by the goal of generating a demand function which induces the lowest possible price subject to e¢ cient trade.
Finally, for any given value distribution of the buyer, we characterize the combinations of consumer and producer surpluses which can arise as an equilibrium outcome if the buyer has access to some information source. 1 We show that any consumer-producer surplus pair can be implemented if and only if (i) consumer surplus is non-negative, (ii) producer surplus is weakly larger than p , and (iii) total surplus is weakly smaller than the …rst-best surplus. 2 Our observation that, in a contracting environment, an imperfectly informed agent can be better o¤ than a perfectly informed one is also noticed by Kessler (1998). The author considers a principal-agent model where, prior to contracting, an agent observes a payo¤ relevant state with a certain probability. Of course, the principal's contract depends on this probability. The author shows that the agent's payo¤ is not maximized when this probability is one, that is, an agent might bene…t from having less than perfect information. We not only con…rm this result, but also characterize buyer-optimal learning without imposing any constraints on possible signal structures.
Several papers examine buyers'incentives to acquire costly information about their valuations before participating in auctions. The buyers'learning strategies depend on the selling mechanism announced by the seller. Persico (2000) shows that if the buyers'signals are a¢ liated then they acquire more information in a …rst-price auction than in a second-price one. Compte and Jehiel (2007) show that dynamic auctions tend to generate higher revenue than simultaneous ones. Shi (2011) also analyses models where it is costly for the buyers to learn about their valuations and identi…es the revenue-maximizing auction in private-value environments. In all of these setups, the 1 We are grateful to Ben Brooks for drawing our attention to this problem. 2 In contrast, Bergemann et al. (2015) characterize the possible outcomes in a model where the buyer is fully informed and the seller observes a signal about the buyer's valuation.
seller is able to commit to a selling mechanism before the buyers decide how much information to acquire. In contrast, we characterize buyer-optimal learning in environments where the monopolist best-responds to the buyer's signal structure. 3 Condorelli and Szentes (2015) also consider a bilateral trade model. In contrast to our setup, the distribution of the buyer's valuation is not given exogenously. Instead, the buyer chooses her value-distribution supported on a compact interval and perfectly observes its realization. The seller observes the buyer's distribution but not her valuation and sets a price. The authors show that, as in our model, the equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand and trade always occurs.
Model
There is a seller who has an object to sell to a single buyer. 
Results
First, we argue that the payo¤s of both the buyer and the seller are determined by the marginal distribution of the signal. To this end, let D (G; p) denote the demand at price p if the signal's
where (G; s) denotes the the probability of s according to the CDF G. 6 The seller's optimal price, p, solves max s sD (G; s) and the buyer's payo¤ is R 1 p (s p) dG (s). Therefore, the 3 Another strand of the literature analyzes the seller's incentives to reveal information about the buyers' valuations prior to participating in an auction, see for example, Ganuza (2004), Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) . 4 It is well-known that any pro…t-maximizing mechanism can be implemented by a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. 5 Assuming that the buyer is non-strategic in the …nal stage of the game and buys the object whenever her value estimate weakly exceeds the price has no e¤ect on our results but makes the analysis simpler. 6 Formally, (G; s) = G (s) sup x<s G (x). If G has no atom at s then (G; s) = 0.
problem of designing a buyer-optimal signal structure can be reduced to identifying the marginal signal distribution which maximizes the buyer's expected payo¤ subject to monopoly pricing. Of course, not every CDF corresponds to a signal distribution. In what follows, we characterize the set of distributions that do.
For each unbiased signal structure, v can be expressed as s + " for a random variable " with 
The problem of designing a buyer-optimal signal structure can be stated as follows
In what follows, we call a pair (G; p) an outcome if G 2 G F and p 2 arg max s sD (G; s). In other words, the pair (G; p) is an outcome if there exists an unbiased signal about v which is distributed according to the CDF G and it induces the seller to set price p.
Next, we de…ne a set of distributions and prove that a buyer-optimal signal distribution lies in this set. (ii) G B ; is an outcome and 
Since (G; s) 2 [0; 1], the previous inequality implies
that is, G 1 …rst-order stochastically dominates G. This implies that
where the …rst inequality follows from …rst-order stochastic dominance, the …rst equality from G 2 G F and the last equality from G specifying an atom of size one at s = . Since
is continuous and strictly increasing in B, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there
We are ready to prove part (i). If x B, then (2) and
where the inequality follows from G (s) 1 and the second equality from G B (s) = 1 if s B.
Equations (3)- (5) imply that G is a mean-preserving spread of G B .
To show part (ii), note that since F is a mean-preserving spread of G and G is a mean- To prove part (iii), observe that
where the equality follows from (3) and the observation that the lower bound of the support of G B is . The inequality follows from the fact that the buyer's payo¤ cannot exceed the …rst-best total surplus ( ) minus the seller's pro…t ( ). This inequality is strict whenever the total surplus in the outcome (G; p) is strictly less than , that is, D (G; p) < 1.
Applying Lemma 1 to a buyer-optimal outcome (G; p) yields the result that there is also a buyer-optimal signal distribution in the set G B ;B
. If the distribution of the buyer's signal is G B , it is optimal for the seller to set price which, in turn, provides the buyer with a payo¤ of . A buyer-optimal signal distribution is therefore de…ned by the lowest for which G B 2 G F .
Let us de…ne p as this lowest value, that is,
and let B denote the unique value for which G B p 2 G F . We are ready to state our main result.
Theorem 1
The outcome G B p ; p maximizes the buyer's payo¤ across all outcomes. If the outcome (G; p) also maximizes the buyer's payo¤ then
Parts (i) and (ii) of this theorem imply that trade occurs at price p with certainty in any buyer-optimal outcome. A consequence of this is that the buyer's payo¤ is p whenever the signal is buyer-optimal. In general, the buyer's optimal CDF is not determined uniquely because there might be many CDFs which second-order stochastically dominate F and induce the seller to set price p . However, according to part (iii), the CDF G B p second-order stochastically dominates any other buyer-optimal CDF. This means that G B p provides the buyer with less information than any other buyer-optimal CDF. If F = G B p , the optimal information structure is unique and it speci…es perfect learning, that is, s = v.
Proof. Let (G; p) be a buyer-optimal outcome and let denote pD (G; p). By Lemma 1, there
is an outcome. Then,
where the …rst inequality follows from part (iii) of Lemma 1 and the second inequality follows from (6). Since (G; p) is buyer-optimal, the outcome G B p ; p is also buyer-optimal and both inequalities are equalities. Part (iii) of Lemma 1 implies that the …rst inequality is strict unless D (G; p) = 1, which proves part (ii). The second inequality is strict unless = p , which proves part (i). Finally, given that = p , part (i) of Lemma 1 implies part (iii).
Next, we solve for an optimal information structure in the case where the buyer's valuation is uniformly distributed, and compare the outcome to that realised in the full-information environment.
Example. Suppose that the buyer's valuation is distributed uniformly on [0; 1], that is,
Therefore, in order to guarantee that the expected value generated by G B p is one half, it must be that
The CDF F is a mean-preserving spread of G 
The smallest p which satis…es these inequalities is approximately 0:2037. That is, p 0:2 and, by (7), B 0:87. In other words, by designing the signal structure optimally, the buyer is able to trade at a price just above 0:2. The buyer's payo¤ is p 0:3 and the seller's payo¤ is
It is insightful to compare the outcome resulting from a buyer-optimal signal structure to that realized in the full information case, i.e. s = v. If the buyer observes her valuation prior to trade then she is willing to trade at price p with probability 1 p. Hence, the seller's optimal price solves max p p (1 p), so the equilibrium price is 0:5. In turn, the seller's payo¤ is 0:25 since the buyer trades with probability one half at price 0:5. The seller is therefore better o¤ if the buyer receives a perfectly informative signal than if she receives a buyer-optimal one. The buyer's payo¤ is R 1 0:5 v 0:5dv = 0:125 which is less than half of her payo¤ under the optimal signal structure.
The deadweight loss due to the buyer's perfectly informative signal is also 0:125.
In the previous example, the seller's pro…t induced by the buyer-optimal signal structure is smaller than his pro…t in the full-information environment. We now generalize this observation and show that a buyer-optimal signal structure is in fact a signal structure that minimizes the seller's pro…t.
This corollary states that the seller's pro…t from an outcome is at least p . Moreover, by Theorem 1, the seller's pro…t induced by any buyer-optimal signal structure is p . The seller's minimum pro…t is therefore p .
Proof. Let denote pD (G; p). This corollary can be used to characterize the combinations of those consumer and producer surplus which can arise as an equilibrium outcome for some signal s. We argue that the set of these payo¤ pro…les is the convex hull of the following three points: (0; p ), (0; ) and ( p ; p ) 
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to analyse a buyer's optimal learning when facing a monopolist. We characterized the buyer-optimal signal distribution which involves minimal learning. The demand induced by this signal is unit-elastic and makes the seller indi¤erent between setting any price on its support. We also proved that all buyer-optimal signal structures generate the same price and e¢ cient trade.
It is not hard to extend our characterization of the least informative buyer-optimal signal structure to environments where the buyer's valuation can be negative and the seller has a positive valuation for the object. 8 There, the optimal signal structure may provide the buyer with a single value estimate which is smaller than the equilibrium price. Conditional on not getting this signal, 7 The characterization of Bergemann et al. (2015) is also based on constructing information structures which make the seller indi¤erent on large sets of prices. 8 For further details, see http://docs.akroesler.com/extensions.pdf
